The part of the international community that believes Myanmar should return to democratic rule – which includes most of ASEAN – faces some difficult problems in trying to make that happen. This is not a new situation, and the world continues to struggle with dealing with countries similarly hermetically sealed such as North Korea – to a lesser extent Russia – and as it did 20 years ago with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
At the heart of the matter is the ability of these military-based authoritarian regimes to completely insulate themselves against external pressure by securing their own wealth and trying to maintain a monopoly on the overwhelming use of deadly force. It is believed that the senior leadership of Myanmar’s Tatmadaw only very rarely travels outside the country and do not own any property on foreign soil. Partly as a consequence of decades of sanctions the financial sector could be described as semi-autonomous.
Putting all of this together means that broad sanctions will not hurt the military – or at the least cause only minor inconvenience – while having the potential to dramatically worsen the living standards of ordinary people. However, in good conscience, liberal democracies cannot stand back and simply wash their hands of the situation and go along with the brutal suppression of what had been up until the coup of February 1 a functioning democracy – admittedly with a number of flaws, the most notable being the continuing oppression of Myanmar’s numerous ethnic groups.
Here is where the outside world can exert some leverage – though it would have to be used with extreme care to minimise the chances of provoking the Tatmadaw into further increasing the level of internal violence. Without wishing to see everything through the eyes of ethnicity, Myanmar – previously known as Burma – was never a unitary state with the Bamar majority making up roughly two-thirds of the population. Another one-fifth are made up of the people of the Shan, Karen and Rakhine states – all of which have fought armed struggles for independence.
If anyone wants to put pressure on the Bamar-dominated Tatmadaw, one way would be to start arguing for semi-statehood for those troubled areas – in essence hinting at support for a partial breakup of the country. This is not as far-fetched as it might at first sound, because in these regions the authority of the central government is limited and many groups have had no choice but to organise their own societies, particularly regarding education, health care and security. An alliance between pro-democracy activists and ethnic minorities might contribute to the pressure campaign.
But before starting to swing this potentially very provocative stick, there should still be scope for dialogue – and a test will be a special ASEAN meeting on Saturday in Jakarta, convened to discuss the problem. It has been confirmed by Thailand that the head of Myanmar’s military government, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing will attend the summit – which if he follows through will be his first trip outside the country since the coup. One of the first questions he is likely to be asked is about the condition of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is still being detained on a variety of fabricated charges.
To date, the Tatmadaw has shown very little interest in any dialogue or negotiations so if General Min shows up that will be a small but encouraging sign. Also, the location of Jakarta for the meeting is highly significant. It is understood that very much behind the scenes in the 2000s, the Indonesian military played a significant role in persuading their counterparts from Myanmar that the transition to a democratic society could be managed in such a way as to allow them to maintain a degree of influence and economic independence.
The Indonesian military apparently used the best possible example – themselves. After the end of the Suharto era in 1998 and the establishment of a more democratic government, the armed forces lost much of their clout – such as being guaranteed 20% of the seats in Parliament – but not all of it. Other privileges were constrained, such as the ability to siphon off a lot of money through the use of military resources for private gain.
These compromises turned out to be compatible with a democratic system that did not punish senior members of the armed forces for previous bad behaviour. It is believed that the example of Indonesia might have had some influence on the Tatmadaw – however reluctantly – to taking the first steps in 2008 towards a democratic system, affirmed subsequently in the elections of 2015 that were largely judged to be free and fair. If as seems likely the Indonesian military continues to have access to their counterparts in Myanmar, they could be influential in arguing for a return to democracy – at the very least an end to the current thuggish levels of violence and oppression.
As well as the potential influence of ASEAN, a critically important ally of Myanmar is China – but whether Beijing is inclined to use its influence is unclear. It is a pity that relations between China on the one hand and the US and Japan on the other are so bad at the moment because if all three could work together and speak with one voice urging for an end to the worst features of the coup – shooting protesters, including children, arbitrary detention with torture included – they might actually be listened to.
Perhaps the only hope in this regard is that Beijing would also not be advantaged by the further disintegration of Myanmar. They share a porous 2,000km long border that has been the source of friction because of illegal activities such as people smuggling and the drug trade. If Beijing sees a stable and prosperous Myanmar as being more compatible than a largely failed state next door that might be a positive development. But the unfortunate reality is that Myanmar will continue a descent into a despotic military dictatorship with no end in sight.
For Editorial Inquiries Contact:
Editor Kym Bergmann at kym.bergmann@venturamedia.net
For Advertising Inquiries Contact:
Director of Sales Graham Joss at graham.joss@venturamedia.net
